No. S-165851
Vancouver Registry

**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA**

BETWEEN:

JULIA LAMB and BRITISH COLUMBIA CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION

PLAINTIFFS

AND:

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

DEFENDANT

**NOTICE OF APPLICATION**

**Names of applicants:** **The Plaintiffs, Julia Lamb and British Columbia Civil Liberties Association**

To: The Defendant, Attorney General of Canada ("**AGC**")

TAKE NOTICE that an application will be made by the applicants to the presiding judge or master at the courthouse at 800 Smithe Street, Vancouver, British Columbia on 12-13 Jun 2017, at 10:00 a.m. for the orders set out in Part 1 below:

**Part 1: ORDERS SOUGHT**

1. An order under Rule 9-5(1)(b), (d) and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the court striking Part 1, Division 2, ¶8-13 of AGC's Response to Civil Claim ("**Response**");

2. An order that AGC is estopped and/or barred, by the operation of principles of issue estoppel and/or abuse of process, from re-litigation in the action herein of the matters determined by the BCSC in *Carter v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2012 BCSC 886 ("**Trial Reasons**") and the SCC in *Carter v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2015 SCC 5 ("***Carter #1***"), specifically, factual and legal conclusions as to:

a. when palliative sedation is available to patients, as found at Trial Reasons, ¶201;

b. what symptoms may cause suffering and whether palliative care can or will alleviate all suffering, as found at Trial Reasons, ¶309;

c. whether presently available end-of-life practices are legal and ethical, as found at Trial Reasons, ¶¶309, 357;

d. whether palliative care is universally available, as found at Trial Reasons, ¶309;

e. medical ethics and in particular, the role the principles of autonomy, compassion and non-abandonment play in medical ethics, concerning whether physicians esteem and value life and whether physicians are ethically required to act in the best interests of their patients and in accordance with the law, as found at Trial Reasons, ¶¶310-1;

f. whether there is a clear societal consensus about physician-assisted death as found at Trial Reasons, ¶358;

g. the level of success achieved by permissive jurisdictions in the protection of vulnerable individuals, as found at Trial Reasons, ¶¶667, 669-72;

h. whether safeguards in foreign jurisdictions operate to prevent abuse of vulnerable individuals, as found at Trial Reasons, ¶¶662, 667, 672, 847, 852, 883, 1241-2;

i. what inferences can be drawn with respect to the likely effectiveness of comparable safeguards in Canada, as found at Trial Reasons, ¶¶683-5, 847, 853, 883, 1239-40, 1284, 1367 and *Carter #1*, ¶¶110-3;

j. the impact that legalization of physician-assisted dying will have on palliative care, as found at Trial Reasons, ¶¶733-736, 1272-73;

k. the impact that legalization of physician-assisted dying will have on the physician-patient relationship, as found at Trial Reasons, ¶¶746, 1269-71, 1281, 1326;

l. whether it is feasible for a physician to reliably assess patient competence, informed consent and ambivalence in medical decision-making, including for physician-assisted death, as found at Trial Reasons, ¶¶795, 798, 815, 831, 843, 853, 1368;

m. whether decision-making to seek medically hastened death is akin or analogous to decision-making to commit suicide, as found at Trial Reasons, ¶¶813-5;

n. the impact that the availability/unavailability of physician-assisted dying can have on the life-span of those who would seek that service but cannot legally do so, as found at Trial Reasons, ¶¶1042, 1268, 1277, 1280, 1325;

o. how the interests of individuals with physical disabilities that render them unable to end their lives by their own actions are impacted when the law prevents them from obtaining assistance to die, as found at Trial Reasons, ¶¶1159, 1279-80;

p. that suicide and attempted suicide are serious health problems that governments are trying to address, and that a prohibition against assisted dying may have the salutary effect of sending an anti-suicide message and a message about the value of every life, including the lives of the disabled, as found at Trial Reasons, ¶1265;

q. that a law denying access to assisted dying to persons who are disabled, grievously ill and suffering intractably sends a negative message about the importance of the wishes and suffering of those persons, as found at Trial Reasons, ¶1266;

r. that denying access to physician-assisted dying to persons deprives those persons of autonomy, self-worth and the opportunity to make a choice fundamental to their sense of dignity and personal integrity and consistent with their values, as found at Trial Reasons, ¶¶1326-27;

s. that denying access to physician-assisted dying to persons subjects those persons to

prolonged physical pain, psychological suffering, fear and/or stress, as found at Trial Reasons, ¶¶1328-29;

t. that denying access to physician-assisted dying to persons subjects those person's loved ones to risk of prosecution, as found at Trial Reasons, ¶1330.

3. A further order that the plaintiffs may rely on the facts relating to the matters referred to above, as set out in the Trial Reasons and *Carter #1* at the paragraphs referenced above, in these proceedings without the necessity of introducing evidence of same.

4. An order that AGC is estopped and/or barred from re-litigation in the action herein, by the operation of principles of issue estoppel and/or abuse of process and/or collateral attack, from asserting that the declaration and judgment in *Carter #1* were limited in scope to persons in the narrow factual circumstances of Gloria Taylor (i.e., persons whose medical conditions made natural death reasonably foreseeable/had incurable conditions/were in an advanced and irreversible state of decline).

5. Costs including special costs of this application to the plaintiffs in any event of the cause;

6. Such other relief as the Court deems just and appropriate.

**Part 2: FACTUAL BASIS**

**Introduction**

1. The Response, ¶1, Part 1 admits "(in part)" the facts set out at ¶¶49-64 of the Notice of Civil Claim, and then ¶8 states:

> In response to the Plaintiff's rendition of the facts in *Carter* as a whole from paragraphs 49 – 64 of the Notice of Civil Claim, the Defendant admits that the trial judge made these findings of fact. However, these findings are specific to the context in which they were made, which was a challenge to the absolute prohibition on physician-assisted dying. The Defendant does not admit that these findings remain true today or that they are applicable in the present case.

2. These proceedings ("**Lamb Proceedings**") challenge the constitutional validity of the portions of s. 241.2 of the *Criminal Code*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 ("***Criminal Code***"), as amended by Bill C-14 (assented to on June 27, 2016), identified in the Notice of Civil Claim as the "impugned laws" ("**2016 Laws**").

3. The 2016 Laws have not previously been the subject of constitutional litigation; however, as is set out below, the effect of, necessity for, and benefits and harms associated with the impugned laws have been the subject of extensive, recent litigation, as evidenced by the Trial Reasons and *Carter #1*.

**The 2016 Laws**

4. In April 2011, the BCCLA and a number of directly affected individuals launched a challenge ("**Carter Proceedings**") to the provisions of the *Criminal Code* which, at that time,

imposed an absolute prohibition against medically assisted dying which was applicable to all persons in Canada ("**Carter Laws**").

5. The trial judge held that the Carter Laws breached *Charter* ss. 7 and s. 15, and that neither breach was justified under s. 1; (Trial Reasons, ¶¶16-8, 1393). The BC Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the basis of the doctrine of *stare decisis,* Finch C.J., dissenting: *Carter v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2013 BCCA 435 ("***Carter* BCCA Reasons**"), ¶¶322-24.

6. On October 15, 2015, the Supreme Court Canada unanimously declared that the absolute prohibition under the Carter Laws unjustifiably infringed s. 7 of the *Charter* and that those provisions are of no force or effect to the extent that they prohibited physician-assisted death for a competent adult person who (1) clearly consents to the termination of life and (2) has a grievous and irremediable medical condition (including an illness, disease or disability) that causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances of his or her condition. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the Carter Laws also violated s. 15. The Court suspended its declaration of invalidity (*Carter #1*, ¶¶127-8)

7. Canada enacted the 2016 Laws to replace the Carter Laws. Under the 2016 Laws, only a subset of Canadians are entitled to access to medically assisted dying in accordance with the criteria identified in *Carter #1* (those criteria are: (1) competent, (2) grievously and irremediably ill, (3) adult, (4) voluntarily seeking assisted dying, and (5) seeking it on an informed basis ["**Carter Criteria**"].) Persons outside the permitted subset (e.g., those whose natural death is not reasonably foreseeable) ("**Excluded Persons**") remain absolutely prohibited under the 2016 Laws, even if they meet the Carter Criteria.

8. Canada has expressed its reasons for continuing the narrower absolute prohibition that applies to Excluded Persons under the 2016 Laws. (Badea #1, Ex. B Legislative Backgrounder) and 2016 Laws (Preamble)

9. The Lamb Proceedings are a challenge to the narrower absolute prohibition that is continued against Excluded Persons under the 2016 Laws. The Lamb Plaintiffs assert that the 2016 Laws' continued imposition of an absolute prohibition is fundamentally inconsistent with the minimum constitutional rights established by the declaration, judgment and findings in the Trial Reasons and *Carter #1*.

**The Carter Proceedings**

10. The Carter Plaintiffs claimed that: (a) to the extent the Carter Laws prohibited competent, grievously and irremediably ill adults who are voluntarily seeking physician-assisted dying on an informed basis from receiving assistance, they were contrary to s. 7 of the *Charter*; (b) to the extent the Carter Laws prohibit competent, materially physically disabled, grievously and irremediably ill adults who are voluntarily seeking physician-assisted dying on an informed basis from receiving assistance and thereby disproportionately impact the disabled, they were contrary to s. 15 of the *Charter*.

11. Thus, the core[1] *Charter* claimant group in *Carter* consisted of individuals meeting the Carter Criteria.

12. The respondents in the Carter Proceedings were AGC and the Attorney General British Columbia ("**AGBC**").

13. The Carter Plaintiffs took the position that it was possible to reliably vet the Carter Criteria for individuals seeking access to assisted dying.

14. AGC disputed that reliable assessment for compliance with the Carter Criteria was possible (especially with regard to the disabled), and also asserted that a permissive regime would, *inter alia*, convey negative messages about suicide as a solution and about the disabled.

15. In its Response in the Carter Proceedings, AGC asserted, *inter alia*, the following (Part 1, Division 3): (a) People suffering from disability are vulnerable to being persuaded to choose death (¶12), and such persuasion may be extremely subtle and unintentional (¶¶13-14); (b) It is difficult or impossible to assess the voluntariness or quality of decisions to choose assisted dying made by disabled people (¶15); (c) The legalization of assisted death would suggest that "the government condones and/or encourages people suffering from illness or disability to choose death" (¶19). (Halliday #1, Ex. B, pp. 30-31)

16. Extensive evidence was placed before the *Carter* trial court with respect to the factual issues in dispute.

17. Notably, *inter alia* the Carter Respondents put into evidence: (a) testimony from several experts in suicide and suicide prevention: Drs. Mishara, (see Trial Reasons, ¶¶766, 800), Heisel, (see Trial Reasons, ¶¶768, 812); and Hendin (see Trial Reasons ¶¶794, 796), as well as evidence about suicide prevention programs; (b) evidence intended to demonstrate that the disabled were especially vulnerable to being encouraged to, or improperly permitted to, end their lives contrary to their true wishes if PAD was permitted (see Trial Reasons, ¶¶848-53).

18. At trial, AGC asserted that the objective of the Carter Laws was as follows:

> ... Canada argues these objectives for the legislation: (1) preserving life by not condoning the taking of life; and (2) preventing harm to individuals and society including: (a) protecting vulnerable individuals from being induced to commit suicide in moments of weakness; (b) preventing damage to the doctor-patient relationship; (c) preventing a negative impact on palliative care; and (d) preventing negative messages about the value of human life, particularly the value of the lives of individuals with disabilities. (Trial Reasons, ¶1187; Halliday #1, Ex. B, p.329(AGC Written Submissions, ¶¶577-579))

19. In AGC's Written Submissions dated November 14, 2011, AGC:

> a. Argued that allowing physician assisted dying was inconsistent with the governmental objective of reducing suicide (¶¶94-5) (Halliday #1, Ex. E, p. 178);

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[1] With the s. 15 claimants needing to meet all the Carter Criteria, and also to be materially physically disabled such that they could not terminate their lives without assistance.

b. Asserted a need to protect especially vulnerable populations "such as Aboriginal communities and the elderly" from the risk of suicide (¶¶106-8); (Halliday #1, Ex. E, pp. 183-4)

c. Recognized that the case was *not* restricted to the terminally ill (¶¶187-90, 196) (Halliday #1, Ex. E, pp. 211-3, 215);

d. Argued that the fact that the case was not limited to the terminally ill was relevant to the engagement of the security of person interest under s. 7 (¶240) (Halliday #1, Ex. E, pp. 228-9);

e. Argued that pre-conceived perceptions about persons with disabilities could impact the reliability of eligibility assessments for the disabled (¶¶359-60) (Halliday #1, Ex. E, pp. 261-2);

f. Argued that assisted dying should not be made available to persons with treatable conditions (¶¶366-67) (Halliday #1, Ex. E, pp. 263-4);

g. Argued that the Carter Laws were required to protect vulnerable people from inaccurate eligibility assessments and the harms of negative messaging (¶402) (Halliday #1, Ex. E, p. 275), and in particular to protect: (i) the elderly (¶¶403-417) (Halliday #1, Ex. E, pp. 275-81), and (ii) individuals with disabilities (¶¶418-437) (Halliday #1, Ex. E, pp. 281-7);

h. Argued that the Carter Laws were required to prevent "negative messaging", including that suicide was an appropriate solution to problems (¶¶438-450) (Halliday #1, Ex. E, pp. 287-91);

i. Relied on all the above points and evidence again in its section 1 justification argument (¶¶577-601) (Halliday #1, Ex. E, pp. 329-34), including asserting that "vulnerable people could be induced to commit suicide or consent to euthanasia" and that "no safeguard can address the negative social messaging that some lives are less valuable than others" (¶598) (Halliday #1, Ex. E, p. 334).

20. The Carter Plaintiffs argued that the evidence established individuals, including disabled persons, could be (and in other life and death medical contexts were already being) assessed in accordance with Carter Criteria, and that government was well-placed to carry out "positive messaging" or conduct general public education in order to allay any concerns about "negative messaging" arising from legalized assisted dying.

21. The trial judge canvassed the evidence and made extensive, detailed findings of fact and set out her legal reasoning at length, including (a) as to negative messaging resulting from permitting assisted dying: Trial Reasons, ¶¶1191, 1252-3, 1265; and (b) as to the feasibility of assessing the eligibility of disabled persons - including AGC's assertion that disabled people should not be permitted access to assisted dying because of their particular vulnerability: Trial Reasons, ¶¶848-53, 1118-20, 1126-7, 1129.

22. The trial judge found the Carter Laws breached ss. 7 and 15 of the *Charter*, and that neither breach was justified under s. 1: Trial Reasons, ¶¶16-8, 1393.

23. AGC's appeal succeeded on the basis of *stare decisis*: *Carter* BCCA Reasons, ¶¶322-24.

24. The SCC granted leave to appeal. It also granted AGC's motion to enter new evidence, and AGC filed an affidavit purporting to update the trial record about assisted dying cases in Belgium since the trial. The Carter Plaintiffs filed a response affidavit.

25. The SCC unanimously upheld the trial judge's finding that the Carter Laws constituted an unjustified breach of s. 7 of the *Charter* to the extent they prohibited assistance for persons meeting the Carter Criteria. The Court found it unnecessary to address s. 15. The declaration of invalidity was suspended for 12 months: *Carter #1*, ¶¶127-8.

26. The SCC rejected AGC's position that the Carter Laws were justified because there were persons for whom the risk of being allowed to decide for themselves involved too many possible sources of error. The SCC agreed with the trial judge that individual assessments for decisional capability in life and death contexts were not only feasible, they were already being carried out in respect of other end-of-life decisions: *Carter #1*, ¶¶114-6.

27. The SCC noted the trial judge's factual findings at length, and dismissed all of AGC's challenges to those findings, including of social and legislative fact: *Carter #1*, ¶¶104-9.

28. The SCC rejected AGC's claim that its new evidence was significant to the issues of compliance or expansion in permitting regimes, stating that none of the new evidence undermined the trial judge's findings of fact. It further noted that the new evidence offered little insight into how a Canadian regime would operate: *Carter #1*, ¶¶110-3.

***Carter #2* Litigation**

29. AGC applied to the SCC for an extension of the suspension of the declaration of invalidity made in *Carter #1*. On January 15, 2016, the majority granted a four month extension period. The majority exempted Quebec from the extension and granted an exemption to those who wished to exercise their rights by application to the superior court of their jurisdiction for relief in accordance with the Carter Criteria during the extension period: *Carter v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2016 SCC 4 (***Carter #2***), ¶7.

30. The fact that the *Carter #1* was not limited to persons suffering from terminal medical conditions was expressly admitted by AGC in *Carter #2*: Badea #1, Ex A.

***Carter #2* Exemption Applications**

31. During the four month extension period, individuals sought and obtained exemptions on the basis of the Carter Criteria: e.g. *A.A. (Re)*, 2016 BCSC 570.

32. In one such application, AGC argued that the scope the *Carter #1* relief extended only to persons whose circumstances narrowly paralleled those of Gloria Taylor. The Alberta motions judge disagreed. So did a unanimous division of the ABCA. Leave to appeal to the SCC was not sought: *Canada (Attorney General) v. E.F.*, 2016 ABCA 155 ("***E.F.***").

33. Nor did AGC appeal a subsequent Ontario Superior Court decision that also concluded that nothing in *Carter #1* required the medical condition in question to be terminal or life-threatening: *I.J. v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2016 ONSC 3380 ("***I.J.***").

**Part 3: LEGAL BASIS**

1. The Plaintiffs rely on: Rule 9-5(1)(b) and (d) of the Rules of Court, the Court's inherent jurisdiction of and the law of issue estoppel, abuse of process, and collateral attack.

2. A pleading is frivolous if it is unsustainable by virtue of the doctrine of estoppel or is otherwise an abuse of process: *Moulton Contracting Ltd. v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia*, 2010 BCSC 506, ¶41.

**Issue Estoppel**

3. In *Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc.*, 2001 SCC 44 (***"Danyluk"***), the Court reviewed the law of issue estoppel. Issue estoppel requires an applicant to strike to establish the following (¶25): (a) the same issues have been decided in the first action; (b) the parties to that action (or their privies) are the same persons as the parties to the second action (or their privies); and (c) the judicial determination was final.

4. The findings cited in ¶¶49-64 of the Lamb Notice of Civil Claim were fundamental to the *Carter* decision. The factual disputes were squarely before the court and made the subject of evidence and argument. Although AGC challenged findings on appeal and was even permitted to enter additional evidence before the SCC, none of the facts found at trial – adjudicative, social or legislative - were overturned on appeal.

5. AGC and the BCCLA were both parties to the Carter Proceedings. Further, the BCCLA was granted public interest standing to represent people meeting and potentially meeting the claimant group criteria (i.e., the Carter Criteria). Julia Lamb was one such person and should properly be regarded as a privy to the Carter Plaintiffs.

**Abuse of Process**

6. Courts have inherent jurisdiction and residual discretion to prevent misuse of the court's procedure in a way that would be manifestly unfair to a party or bring the administration of justice into disrepute: *Behn v. Moulton Contracting Ltd.*, 2013 SCC 26 (***"Behn"***), ¶39; *Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local* 79, 2003 SCC 63 (***"Toronto"***), ¶35.

7. The concerns of abuse of process are "the integrity and the coherence of the administration of justice" and "of judicial decision making" (*Toronto*, ¶¶29, 43).

8. Abuse of process is flexible. It precludes re-litigation where the requirements of issue estoppel (typically, privity) are not met, but allowing the litigation would violate such principles as judicial economy, consistency, finality and the integrity of the administration of justice: *Henry v. H.M.T.Q.*, 2015 BCSC 1798, ¶18; *Toronto*, ¶¶39-42.

9. It applies not only where a party has litigated an issue, but also where a party "*should* have raised an issue at the appropriate time" in earlier proceedings: *Behn*, ¶¶37, 43; *Aba-Alkhail v. University of Ottawa*, 2013 ONCA 633, ¶12 (leave to appeal dismissed: 2014 CanLII 11029 (SCC)).

10. No exceptional circumstances exist here. There is no suggestion that the Carter Proceedings

were tainted by fraud or dishonesty, nor can it be said that the stakes in the original proceeding were too minor to generate a full and robust response.

11. Canada has not identified any significant new evidence it will have on any issues before this Court that will differ from the record considered in the Carter Proceedings, let alone any evidence that has "fundamentally shift[ed] the parameters of the debate": *Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford,* 2013 SCC 72 (***"Bedford"***), ¶¶42-4. This case comes immediately on the heels of the Carter Proceedings and AGC entered such new evidence as it thought significant at the SCC level in *Carter #1*. Further, the SCC in *Carter #1* made a clear finding that additional evidence about foreign jurisdictions would not be of sufficient weight or import to undermine the trial judge's findings of facts.

12. The issue of fairness requires special attention where the issue is not only fairness as between the parties but to the public as well in light of the chronic issue of access to justice that plagues the justice system and the nature of public interest litigation.

**Replacement Legislation**

13. The fact that the Lamb Proceedings involve replacement legislation is of no consequence to this application. This is not a challenge to a "new regime". The instant proceedings are limited to challenging the 2016 Laws on the basis that they do not comply with the constitutional minimums articulated in *Carter #1* and are, in fact, limited to challenging the narrower absolute prohibition in the 2016 Laws that continues, vis-à-vis the Excluded Persons, the prohibition formerly imposed by the Carter Laws.

14. The enactment of replacement legislation does not "reinvent the wheel" of litigation: *J.T.I. Macdonald Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 102 CRR (2d) 189, ¶83 and 102-007; *British Columbia Teachers' Federation v. British Columbia,* 2014 BCSC 121, ¶111. *Bedford* has made it clear that social and legislative findings are no more open to question than any other findings of fact: ¶53. Notably, the SCC has already expressly held, in response to that new evidence in *Carter #1*, that adding more foreign evidence will not be sufficient to undermine the *Carter* findings of fact.

**Collateral Attack**

15. A collateral attack may be described as an attack made in proceedings other than those whose specific object is the reversal, variation, or nullification of the order or judgment: *Wilson v. The Queen*, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 594 at p. 599 (per McIntyre J.) [***"Wilson"***].

16. AGC did not appeal the decisions in *E.F.* or *I.J.* AGC has run the same argument about implicit limitations on *Carter #1* in two different fora already. It is a collateral attack on the judgments of those Courts, and an abuse of process, to do so a third time here: *Wilson*; *Danyluk* at ¶48-50.

**Part 4: MATERIAL TO BE RELIED ON**

1. Affidavit # 1 of Nicoleta Badea, made 05 Apr 2017;
2. Affidavit #1 of Jessi Halliday, made 19 May 2017; and
3. Affidavit #2 of Jessi Halliday, made 23 May 2017.

The applicants estimate that the application will take 2 days.

This matter is not within the jurisdiction of a master.

TO THE PERSONS RECEIVING THIS NOTICE OF APPLICATION: If you wish to respond to this notice of application, you must, within 5 business days after service of this notice of application or, if this application is brought under Rule 9-7, within 8 business days after service of this notice of application,

(a) file an application response in Form 33,

(b) file the original of every affidavit, and of every other document, that

  (i) you intend to refer to at the hearing of this application, and

  (ii) has not already been filed in the proceeding, and

(c) serve on the applicant 2 copies of the following, and on every other party of record one copy of the following:

  (i) a copy of the filed application response;

  (ii) a copy of each of the filed affidavits and other documents that you intend to refer to at the hearing of this application and that has not already been served on that person;

  (iii) if this application is brought under Rule 9-7, any notice that you are required to give under Rule 9-7 (9).

Dated: 23 May 2017

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Signature of lawyer for the applicants
**Joseph J. Arvay, Q.C.**

***To be completed by the court only:***

Order made

☐ in the terms requested in paragraphs _____ of Part 1 of this notice of application

☐ with the following variations and additional terms:

_____

_____

_____

Date: _____ _____

Signature of ☐ Judge ☐ Master

**APPENDIX**

**THIS APPLICATION INVOLVES THE FOLLOWING:**

☐ discovery: comply with demand for documents
☐ discovery: production of additional documents
☐ other matters concerning document discovery
☐ extend oral discovery
☐ other matter concerning oral discovery
☐ amend pleadings
☐ add/change parties
☐ summary judgment
☐ summary trial
☐ service
☐ mediation
☐ adjournments
☐ proceedings at trial
☐ case plan orders: amend
☐ case plan orders: other
☐ experts